The draft resolution the U.S. intends
to present to the UN Security Council on 29 November could trigger all-out
war in Somalia and destabilise the entire Horn of Africa region by
escalating the proxy conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea to dangerous
new levels.
Instead of siding with one party in the
civil conflict – the weak and fragmented Ethiopia-backed Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) – the Council should apply maximum pressure on
both it and the Eritrea-backed Council of Somali Islamic Courts (CSIC) to
resume negotiations without preconditions.
The proposed resolution, which has the
backing of African members of the Security Council, would authorise
deployment of a regional military force (IGASOM) in support of the TFG and
exempt that entity and troop contributing countries – Ethiopia, Uganda and
possibly Kenya, amongst others – from the existing UN arms embargo. While
its objectives are to strengthen the TFG, deter the CSIC from further
expansion and avert the threat of full-scale war, it is likely to backfire
on all three counts.
Crisis Group has consistently opposed
deployment of a regional intervention force – especially one involving
front-line states such as Ethiopia – unless it has the consent of all
warring parties, and called for more robust enforcement of the UN arms
embargo. The UN Monitoring Group, which reported on 16 October, similarly
cited the dangers of such a deployment and urged instead strengthening the
arms embargo through surveillance of all Somali borders.
Despite international recognition, the
TFG has never enjoyed broad support or legitimacy within Somalia, and the
TFG parliament split badly when it debated the issue of foreign troops in
March 2005. Actual deployment would likely fracture the parliament beyond
repair and reinforce the impression that the TFG is simply a proxy for
Ethiopia. The loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali public would be
irreversible.
The CSIC, which controls most of south
central Somalia, has repeatedly declared that it will wage a “jihad”
against any foreign troops on Somali territory, including the Ethiopians
already deployed there. It would likely perceive Security Council passage
of the resolution as tantamount to a declaration of war. Rather than wait
for the TFG to arm itself, it might well launch a pre-emptive attack on
its seat in Baidoa. The CSIC is viewed as a danger to its neighbours
because of its irredentist views, and support for international terrorist
elements and cross-border Ethiopian rebel groups. In addition, it
threatens to unseat the internationally recognised TFG. Instead of
prioritising military protection of the TFG against the CSIC – which is
itself receiving military support from as many as eight external countries
– the international community should challenge the CSIC to reform its
stance on each of these points and work towards a negotiated solution with
the TFG.
The TFG and CSIC are scheduled to meet
in Khartoum in mid-December for a third round of Arab League facilitated
peace talks. Although previous talks made little headway, more effective
international pressure on the parties, including a more active involvement
from the UN Secretary General via his Special Representative, would
increase the likelihood of success. Without this, the resolution would
give the CSIC an excuse to withdraw altogether and would kill any hope of
a negotiated ceasefire. Military confrontation would be the only remaining
option.
Instead of authorising deployment of a
regional force, the Council should push both parties to resume peace talks
immediately. First on the agenda should be a comprehensive ceasefire
covering:
 |
disengagement of opposing forces;
|
 |
withdrawal from Somalia of all foreign troops and
military trainers; and
|
 |
deployment of an International Verification Mission to
monitor compliance with the agreement.
|
Any UN-sponsored military deployment
should be designed to support an agreed ceasefire, not undermine efforts
to achieve such a ceasefire, and should be made up of forces acceptable to
both parties. If either party fails to demonstrate genuine commitment to
this process, the Council should impose travel bans on its leaders, freeze
assets and authorise economic sanctions against business interests.
As so often in Somalia, the consequence
of an ill-considered intervention is likely to be more conflict, not less.
Military measures must remain a weapon of last resort.
